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This paper examines the optimal design of pension plans when the health status during 
retirement is uncertain. Assuming that the health status affects both life expectancy and the 
marginal utility of consumption, choice between a lump-sum payment and an annuity can be 
welfare-enhancing if the health status is not observable by pension plans. This result holds if 
the marginal utility of consumption and life expectancy are negatively correlated. On equity 
grounds, a lump-sum option can be justified even if the marginal utility of consumption is 
independent of life expectancy. 
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In a seminal paper, Yaari (1965) showed that individuals who maximize expected
utility should annuitize all of their savings. Recently, Davidoff, Brown, and Di-
amond (2005) extended his analysis and showed that this result also holds under
weaker conditions. Nevertheless, full annuitization remains the exception rather
than the rule. The literature has therefore tried to explain why individuals only
partially annuitize their wealth or choose not to annuitize at all.1
This paper deals with a particular deviation from Yaari’s result. Frequently, indi-
viduals have a choice between a lump-sum payment and an annuity upon entering
retirement. For example, this is the case in many private pension plans. Also
publicly regulated programmes such as Chile’s funded pension system, the Swiss
occupational pension scheme or state-subsidized supplementary private pensions
in Germany (‘Riester pensions’) allow such a choice.
An important question is whether the possibility to select a lump sum can be de-
sirable. In a standard model, this option can only reduce welfare since individuals
with a low life expectancy will opt for the lump sum. This reduces the redistrib-
ution from short-living to long-living individuals which is optimal ex ante when
life expectancy is still uniform (Brugiavini, 1993, and Sheshinski, 2004).
The standard model, however, assumes that the utility function is independent
of life expectancy. This is questionable as life expectancy is closely related to the
health statuswhich is likely to havean impact on the utilityfunction. In this paper,
we show that considering the links between life expectancy, health and utility can
make a lump-sum option valuable. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that rational individuals
might prefer a choice between a lump-sum payment and an annuity if the health
status during retirement is uncertain and unobservable. This is the case if the
marginal utility of consumption and life expectancy are negatively correlated.2
1Possible explanations include inferior returns to annuities due to administrative costs and
selection effects (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1988, 1990, Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and
Brown, 1999), bequest motives (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981, Hurd, 1989, Bernheim, 1991),
incomplete markets (Yagi and Nishigaki, 1993, Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond, 2005), within
family-risk sharing (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981, Brown and Poterba, 2000), and pre-existing an-
nuities from public pensions (Bernheim, 1991).
2A similar result has been obtained by Diamond (2003) in an optimal income tax framework.
He ﬁnds a lump-sum option to be optimal if life expectancy and productivity are positively corre-
lated.
1A related result is obtained by Direr (2007) who extends the standard model by
considering uninsurable expenses during old age. As in the present paper, indi-
viduals discover their survival probabilities after buying an annuity contract. Indi-
viduals with high life expectancy face an uninsurable expenditure risk early in old
age. Dirershowsthataﬂexibleannuityplanis optimalwhich allowsa withdrawal.
It smoothes consumption for individuals who experience the expenditure shock.
The existence of short-lived individuals, however, puts a limit on the withdrawal.3
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model
and derive conditions under which choice in a pension plan is optimal. Section
3 extends the basic model in various directions. In Section 4, we discuss the
implications for public pensions. Here we show that a lump-sum option can also
be justiﬁed on equity grounds. For a strictly concave social welfare function,
this is the case even if the marginal utility of consumption is independent of life
expectancy. Section 5 concludes and points out directions for further research.
2 The basic model
2.1 Health status, marginal utility and life expectancy
Individuals are initially identical. They invest wealth W in a pension plan before
entering retirement. Retirement is reached with probability d < 1. Upon retire-
ment, the health status h = g,b of individuals is revealed. With probability p the
‘good’ state g arises, with probability 1−p the health status is ‘bad’. The health
status has implications both for life expectancy and the marginal utility of con-
sumption:
3Zhang and Tang (2007) examine the optimal choice with an uninsurable expenditure risk in
absence of a withdrawal option. They ﬁnd that individuals may then prefer not to fully annuitize
their wealth.
2• Health status and life expectancy
Individuals with health status b will only live one period after retirement
(period 1). With status g, one can live up to two periods. The survival
probability for period 2 is 0 < r < 1. Individuals possess information on
their life expectancy.4
• Health status and utility
Utility is state-dependent. In state g, utility in each period is u(ct) where
ct is consumption in period t = 1,2. In stage b, utility is au(ct), with
u′(ct)>0, u′′(ct)<0,limct→0u′(ct)=¥ and a>0. We leave open whether
a ≷ 1, i.e. whether marginal utility of consumption is higher in state b or
g for a given level of consumption.5 In particular, we do not ﬁnd a > 1
implausible.6 Knowledge of nearby early death may make consumption
more valuable. For example, individuals may want to spend money on an
expensive trip they always dreamed of.7
For simplicity,consumptionbefore period 1 is not modeled since it does not affect
the structure of the optimal pension plan. Only the amount invested in the annuity
may vary. Furthermore, we assume that the interest rate is zero. Individuals do
not discount the future and have no bequest motive. Finally, we abstract from
further ﬁnancial risks, e.g. medical expenditure, by implicitly assuming that these















4For evidence on this hypothesis, see Hurd and McGarry (1995).
5In the following, we frequently drop the qualiﬁcation “for a given level of consumption” and
simply speak of “marginal utility of consumption being higher in state b (g)” when it is clear that
we refer to a > 1 (< 1).
6Viscusi and Evans (1990) ﬁnd evidence for a lower marginal utility when the health status
declines. However, this study is based on chemical workers and not on elderly. In a further study
using survey data on adults approaching middle age, Evans and Viscusi (1991) could not identify
an effect of health on the marginal utility of consumption.
7In our set-up, a > 1 implies that individuals are actually better off in state b. However, we
can also write utility in the bad state as au(c)−k which is compatible with higher marginal utility
of consumption but lower total utility. Since only marginal utility of consumption is important in
the following, we stick to our simpler version.
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Figure 1: States of nature and utilities
Figure 1 shows the different states of nature and the corresponding utilities. Three
risks which individuals would like to insure against through a pension plan can be
identiﬁed:
(i) the risk to reach retirement,
(ii) the risk that marginal utility differs between the health states,
(iii) the longevity risk in state g.
We assumethat pension plans are actuarially fair and maximizeexpected utilityof
individuals. This can be interpreted as the outcome of competition on the market
for pension plans. Alternatively, this assumption can be justiﬁed by a public pen-
sion scheme set up to meet this objective (see Section 4). Furthermore, we rule
out that individuals can draw loans on future pension payments and guarantee re-
payments through life insurance. Therefore, it is not possible to borrow against
future income.
42.2 Observable health status
If health status is observable, pension plans can make their payments dependent
































From the ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain that marginal utility of consumption
must be the same in all states and periods, i.e.
u′(c
g∗
1 ) = u′(c
g∗







2 = cg∗, cb∗
1 ≷ cg∗ ⇔ a ≷ 1.
Thus, a constant annuity is optimal in the good health state. The payment in the




1 in the bad health state and to providean annuity cg∗ in the
good health state. The payment in the bad health state is larger than
the annuity if and only if marginal utility of consumption is higher in
that state.
2.3 Unobservable health status
In the following, we assume that the health status is not observable. Furthermore,
pension plans do not possess any information on the consumption of individuals
which would allow them to identify the type. Then the optimal pension plan must
be incentive-compatible, i.e. no type should have an advantage by claiming to be








5Clearly, the one-period payments for b-types cannot be smaller than the ﬁrst-




which corresponds to a < 1, i.e. lower marginal utility of consumption in the bad
state of health.
Incentive compatibility for g-types could be ensured if pension plans were able
to punish g-types in period 2 if they claimed a one-period payment since only
g-types can be alive in this period. However, it is doubtful whether courts would
enforce it. We therefore do not consider this possibility.8
??Except for Section 3.5, we also rule out that pension plans can observe the
levels of consumption. Types can therefore not be identiﬁed by their ﬁrst-period
consumption.
If g-types pretend to be b-types, they exchange a one-period payment for a pay-
ment stream over two periods. This raises the question how they ﬁnance their
consumption in period 2. Their preferred method is to annuitize the one-period
payment. In this section, we assume that they are able to do so, e.g. because pen-
sions plan are not able to monitor further annuity purchases.9 The price g-types
must pay for an annuity will be r per unit consumption in period 2 since only g-
types will demand annuities. g-types will therefore buy annuities up to the point
where u′(ˆ c
g
1) = u′(ˆ c
g
2). If g-types claim to be b-types and receive cb
1 in period 1,
their consumption is therefore given by ˆ c
g




utility in period 1













The ﬁrst-best solution violates (ICG) if cb∗
1 > (1+r)cg∗, i.e. if the payment for b-
types is larger than the present value of the annuity for g-types. This is the case if
a exceeds a critical value ˜ a >1. For example, if u(c)= ln(c), we have cb∗
1 =acg∗
in the ﬁrst best which yields a critical value ˜ a = 1+r.
8See also Section 3.5 where we consider that b-types may live up to period 2.







Figure 2: First-best consumption and incentive compatiblity
Figure 2 illustrates the conﬂict between the ﬁrst best and incentive compatibility.
It shows ﬁrst-best consumption cg∗ and cb∗
1 and the present value (1+r)cg∗ as
functions of a. If a < 1, then cb∗
1 < cg∗ and the incentive-constraint for b-types
is violated. a > ˜ a implies cb∗
1 > (1+r)cg∗ and g-types have the incentive to
claim cb∗
1 and convert this into an annuity. We therefore ﬁnd that the ﬁrst best
is incentive-compatible only if a ∈ [1; ˜ a]. In this case, the ﬁrst best can be im-




t . Individuals will self-select since cb∗
1 ≥ cg∗ and (1+r)cg∗ ≥ cb∗
1 .
However, if a < 1 or a > ˜ a, only a second-best solution is possible. We consider
both cases in the following.
Second-best solution for a < 1
If a < 1, then marginal utility of consumption and life expectancy are positively
correlated. The ﬁrst best is not compatible with the incentive constraint for b-
types (ICB). In the second-best solution, this constraint will therefore be binding.
































1 = ˆ c
g
1 = c1 (4)




















with the ﬁrst-order conditions
¶L
¶c1





















Since (p+(1−p)a) < 1, this implies c1 < c
g
2, i.e. the annuity rises over time.10
Thus, the incentive for b-types to claim to be g-types leads to a distorted annuity
for g-types. Ex ante, of course, all individuals are worse off. Compared to ﬁrst
best, it can be shown that cb∗




Second-best solution for a > ˜ a
In thiscase, marginalutilityofconsumptionandlifeexpectancyare stronglynega-
tively correlated. The ﬁrst best violates the incentive constraint for g-types (ICG).





















10Note that we ruled out borrowing against future payments.
11Equation (8) implies au′(c1) < u′(c
g
2). Taking into account the budget constraint, the ﬁrst-
best condition (3) and the incentive constraint (4), this is only possible if c1 > cb∗
1 . Furthermore,
c1 ≥ cg∗ is not compatible with the budget constraint since c
g
2 > c1.
12For constant relative risk aversion y, it can be shown that c
g
































































































1/(1+r)) = 0. (15)









2 = cg (16)
and a standard annuity is optimal for g-types. Substituting into (10) yields
(1+r)u(cg) = (1+r)u(cb
1/(1+r)) ⇒ cb
1 = (1+r)cg > cg, (17)
i.e. the lump-sum payment for b-types and the present value of the annuity for
g-types are the same. In the ﬁrst best, in contrast, a > ˜ a implies that the present
value of the annuity is smaller than the payment for b-types (see Figure 2). Thus,
the annuity level for people in good health must be larger in the second best and
thepaymentforb-typesmustbesmaller. Substituting(16)and(17)intothebudget

























Figure 3: Second-best consumption
as the optimal solution. It can be implemented by giving individuals a choice
between a lump-sum payment and an annuity.13
Proposition 2.2. If the health status is unobservable, then the ﬁrst
best can only be implemented if life expectancy and marginal utility
of consumption are weakly negatively correlated (1 ≤a ≤ ˜ a). Other-
wise, a second-best solution prevails. It is optimal to give individuals
a choice between a lump-sum payment and an annuity if life expec-
tancy and marginal utility of consumption are negatively correlated
(a ≥ 1). Otherwise, an annuity which increases over time is prefer-
able.
Figure 3 illustrates the second-best solution. For a < 1, we have cb∗
1 < c1 < cg∗
and c
g
2 > cg∗, the latter being due to a utility function with constant relative risk
aversion less than one. For a > ˜ a, cb
1 and cg are given by (18).
13It is also possible to implement the second best by paying out a lump sum cb
1 which is then
annuitized by g-types. In Section 3.1 where we allow pension plans to prohibit the purchase of
further annuities, however, this solution is inferior to a choice between a lump-sum payment and
an annuity (see footnote 14).
103 Extensions
In this section, we extend the basic model in various directions to check whether
choice between a lump-sum payment and an annuity at retirement can still remain
optimal. We consider the following extensions:
1. In Subsection3.1, we allowpensionplans to monitorthepurchase offurther
annuities.
2. Imperfect correlation between marginal utility of consumption and life ex-
pectancy is considered in Subsection 3.2.
3. Subsection 3.3 assumes that both types have the same identical close-to-
death utility au(ct).
4. The possibility of moral hazard due to a state-guaranteed minimum income
is examined in Subsection 3.4
5. Subsection 3.5 allows for a positive survival probability to period 2 for in-
dividuals in bad health.
3.1 Monitoring of annuity purchases possible
If annuity purchases can be monitored, pension plans can make it more difﬁcult
for g-types to pretend to be b-types by prohibiting annuitization of the lump-sum
payment. Then the only way for g-types to transfer income to period 2 is to save.



















and therefore ˆ c
g
1(cb
1) > ˆ c
g
2(cb
1) as r < 1. With probability 1−r, individuals will
















11Clearly, theRHS of(21)willbesmallerthan theRHS of(ICG) foragivenvalueof
cb
1. Thus, the corresponding critical value of ˜ amon will be higher than the critical
value ˜ a without monitoring and the ﬁrst best can be implemented for a larger














With the ﬁrst-best condition cb = acg, this yields a critical value
˜ amon = (1+r)r
−
r
1+r > 1+r = ˜ a.
If a > ˜ amon, then we obtain a similar result as in section 2.3. The second best can
be implementedby choice between a lump-sumpayment and a constantannuity.14
However, the present value of the annuity for g-types is lower than lump-sum
payment for b-types.
Proposition 3.1. If pensions plans can monitor further annuity pur-
chases, then the ﬁrst best can be implemented for higher levels of the
marginal utility of consumption in the bad health state.
3.2 Heterogenous marginal utility
Now we relax the assumption that marginal utility is unique given life expectancy.
In each health state, marginal utility can take different values. In state b, utility is
au(cb




2) with b ∈ [b1,b2].















where ¯ a and ¯ b are the average values of a and b.
In the ﬁrst best, we obtain that the marginal utility of consumption should be




t (b)), t = 1,2.
14As opposed to the basic model, only paying out a lump-sum payment cb
1 cannot implement
the second best since g-types are not allowed to annuitize.
12The optimalpay outs are therefore increasing in a and b. This impliesthat theﬁrst
best requires knowledge of these parameters which is highly unlikely. Thus, even
if the health status is observable, only a second-best solution can be implemented.





2) = ¯ au′(cb
1)
which states that marginal utility of consumption should be equalized on average
across health states.












Note that a and b have no impact on the incentive constraints. Thus, they are
identical to (ICB) and (ICG) and we can use the results from above by interpreting
a as the average ¯ a. Thus, although the ﬁrst best cannot be implemented, giving
individuals a choice between a lump-sum payment and an annuity is still optimal
if ¯ a ≥ 1. For 1 ≤ ¯ a ≤ ˜ a, we obtain a second-best solution, otherwise a third best
arises.
Proposition 3.2. If marginal utility of consumption and life expec-
tancy are only imperfectly correlated and neither marginal utility of
consumption nor the health status are observable, then it is optimal
to give individuals a choice between a lump-sum payment and an an-
nuity if life expectancy and marginal utility are negatively correlated.
Otherwise, an annuity which increases over time is preferable.
3.3 Identical close-to-death utility
One argument for state-dependent utility is closeness to certain death. If this rea-
soning applies, we must also assume that the utility function is au(c) for g-types















13Maximizing expected utility subject to the wealth constraint (2) leads to
u′(c
g∗
1 ) = au′(c
g∗
2 ) = au′(cb∗
1 )






1 ⇔ a ≷ 1.
Thus, consumption in the last period of life is identical for both types. Second-
period consumption in good health is higher if marginal utility is larger.
If the health status cannot be observed, the incentive constraint (ICB) for b-types
remains unaffected and the ﬁrst best cannot be implemented for a < 1. In this




















with the ﬁrst-order conditions
¶L
¶c1





















Since p+(1−p)a > a, we have c1 > c
g
2, i.e. the annuity falls over time. This
result also holds in the ﬁrst best. However, g-types’ intertemporal consumption is
distorted since p+(1−p)a < 1 which implies u′(c1) > au′(c
g
2). As in the basic
model, g-types consume too much in the second period.
Turning to the case a >1, we need to consider the incentive constraint for g-types
if the health status is not observable. It is different from the basic model since
g-types will not buy a constant annuity if they select the payment for b-types.
Taking into account their optimal choice of consumption ˆ c
g
t (cb
1) in period t if g-




















which implies ˆ c
g
2(cb
1) > ˆ c
g
1(cb
1). Again, we can determine a critical value ˜ actd up to













2 if the annuity is cho-
















which will be met as long as a is sufﬁciently small. For example, if the utility









Inthebasicmodel, ˜ a=1+r. Since 1
1−r >1+r, thecriticalvalueofaistherefore
larger with identical close-to-death utility. The intuition for this result is that g-
types have less incentives to pretend to be b-types if their annuity is higher when
old.
As long as 1 ≤ a ≤ ˜ actd, the ﬁrst best can be implemented by giving individual a
choice between the lump-sum payment cb∗















































































































1)) = 0. (34)










and an increasing annuity is optimal for g-types. Since u′(ˆ c
g
1(cb











i.e. the lump-sum payment for b-types and the present value of the annuity for
g-types are the same. In the ﬁrst best, we also have an increasing annuity annuity
of g-types. However, the ﬁrst-best lump-sum payment is larger than the present
value of the annuity if a > ˜ actd. Thus, the lump-sum payment must be smaller
in the second best. The same result holds in the basic model. Again, the optimal
solution can be implemented by giving individuals a choice between a lump-sum
payment and an annuity.
Proposition 3.3. When the utility function is the same for both types
in the period prior to death and marginal utility is larger in this pe-
riod, choice between a lump-sum payment and an annuity is optimal
if the health status is unobservable. The only difference to the basic
model is that the annuity must be increasing rather than constant.
163.4 Minimum income and moral hazard
If society grants a minimum income to its citizens, an important concern with
respect to lump-sum withdrawals is moral hazard. Individuals may then have
the incentive to take the lump sum, spend it regardless of their life expectancy on
immediateconsumptionandrely onpublictransfersiftheylivelonger. Torulethis
out, the government may therefore require that individualsonly buy pension plans
which guarantee a payment that is at least as high as the guaranteed minimum
income in each period.
In the following, we examine the consequences of this policy for the second-best
pension plan. We denote minimum income by m and assume that in the ﬁrst best,
individuals do not qualify for public assistance, i.e. cg∗,cb∗
1 > m. If the health
status is not observable, the incentive constraint (ICB) for b-types and therefore
the results for a < 1 remain unchanged. However, the incentive constraint for
g-types needs to modiﬁed. Since the contract for b-types cannot be lump sum, it
consists of a payment cb
1 in period 1 and m in period 2 (which is never paid in
the ﬁrst best). If g-types pretend to be b-types, they therefore can also claim a
payment m in period 2. The present value of the payment for b-types is therefore
(cb







For a given value of cb
1, it is therefore more attractive for g-types to claim to be
b-types. This lowers the critical value ˜ a. For logarithmic utility, we obtain
˜ am = 1+r−
rm
cg∗ < 1+r = ˜ a.15
As above, the ﬁrst best is incentive-compatible if 1 ≤ a ≤ ˜ am. In this case, indi-
viduals can be given a choice between the payment stream cb∗
1 ,m and a constant
annuity cg∗. Since a > 1 implies cb∗
1 > cg∗, we can interpret cb∗
1 −cg∗ as a partial
lump-sum withdrawal which results in a reduction cg∗ −m in the second-period
payment.













































































































1/(1+r)) = 0. (43)










Inserting into condition (38) yields
(1+r)u(cg) = (1+r)u((cb
1+rm)/(1+r)) ⇒ cb
1 = (1+r)cg−rm. (44)
Thus, the present value of the payment for b-types is smaller than the annuity for
g-types. Furthermore, we must have cb
1 > cg > m.16 Therefore, it is optimal to
give individuals a choice between a partial lump-sum withdrawal cb
1 −cg with a
reduction cg−m in the second-period payment and a constant annuity paying cg.
16By (44), cb
1 ≤ cg implies m ≥ cg. Since we assumed for the ﬁrst best cg∗ > m, this implies
cg < cg∗ and, by the budget constraint, cb
1 > cb∗
1 > m. Thus, cb
1 ≤ cg is only possible if cg > m
which is incompatible with (44). Therefore, we must have cb
1 > cg and, by (44), cg > m.
18Proposition 3.4. If the government requires that individuals only buy
pensions plans which guarantee a payment that is at least as high as
minimum income in each period and the health status is not observ-
able, then the ﬁrst best can be implemented for a smaller range of a.
If marginal utility of consumption is higher in the bad health state,
it is optimal to give individuals a choice between a partial lump-sum
withdrawal and a constant annuity.
3.5 Positive survival probability for individuals in bad health
So far, we maintained the assumption that individuals in state b will not live more
than one period. Now we allow both types to survive to the second period. The
respective survival probabilities are rb and rg with 0 < rb < rg < 1, i.e. b-types


















It is straightforward to show that the ﬁrst-best solution requires annuities cg and
cb with
cb ≷ cg ⇔ a ≷ 1.
If the health status is not observable, then it is impossible to implement the ﬁrst
best unless a = 1. If a < 1, then b-types pretend to be g-types and vice versa.
Consequently, one incentive constraint will be binding for a < 1, the other for
a > 1.
In the following, we assume that pension plans can monitor and thus prohibit
further annuity purchases. For simplicity, we also allow pension plans to monitor
and rule out savings (see footnote 19).
Second-best solution for a < 1



































































































2) = 0. (52)
We obtain cb
1 = cb
























Thus, the incentive for b-types to pretend to be g-types is countered by an in-
creasing annuity which is less attractive for b-types. From the binding incentive








Thus, it is optimal to give individuals a choice between a constant and an increas-
ing annuity in period 1.
17The assumption limct→0u′(ct) = ¥ ensures positive marginal utilities.
20Second-best solution for a > 1



























































































































18The assumption limct→0u′(ct) = ¥ ensures positive marginal utilities.
19We assumed that pension plans can prohibit savings. This is necessary if the optimal solution
implies u′(cb
1) < rhu′(cb
2), h = g,b. If savings cannot be monitored then the additional constraint
u′(cb
1) ≥ rgu′(cb
2) needs to be imposed which implies u′(cb
1) ≥ rbu′(cb
2).








This solution can be implemented by allowing individuals a choice between a
partial lump-sum withdrawal cb
1−cg with a reduction cg−cb
2 in the second-period
payment and a constant annuity cg.
Proposition 3.5. If individuals in bad health have a positive prob-
ability to survive to period 2 and a lower life expectancy, the ﬁrst
best cannot be implemented if the health status is not observable. As-
suming that pension plans can rule out further annuity purchases and
savings, it is optimal to give individuals a choice between a partial
lump-sum withdrawal and a constant annuity if life expectancy and
marginal utility are negatively correlated. Otherwise, choice between
a constant and an increasing annuity is preferable.
4 Implications for public pensions
So far, we have left open whether the pension plan is private or public. Since we
assumed that individuals are ex ante identical, however, there seems to be little
justiﬁcation for public intervention. This changes if we consider that individuals
differ already ex ante in their type.20 Assume that a share p lives for certain for
one period and with probability r for two periods, and a share 1−p lives only for
one period. The types are unobservable and the utility of consumption differs as
in the analysis above. For an utilitarian social planner the social welfare function
is then equivalent to the expected utility function (1). Thus, it is optimal for the
social planner to use a lump-sum option if marginal utility of consumption and
life expectancy are negatively correlated.
Furthermore, one can make an argument in favor of a lump-sum option even if
the utility function in each period is not state-dependent, i.e. the per period utility
20In Diamond (2003, Chapter 7) individuals differ ex ante in productivity which is positively
correlated with life expectancy. In an optimal income tax framework, he shows that a lump-
sum option can increase social welfare since it will be chosen by the individuals with low life

















Figure 4: Optimal pension plans and social welfare























with W′ > 0,W′′ ≤ 0. In the utilitarian case W′′ = 0, the objective function is
equivalent to the expected utility function (1) for a = 1. A constant annuity annu-
ity c∗ is therefore optimal. This situation is illustrated by allocation A in Figure 4.
UU is the utility possibility frontier which must be strictly concave due to u′′ < 0.













In A, we haveEUg =(1+r)u(c∗)>u(c∗)=EUb. If thesocial welfare functionis
21I thank Jean-Marie Lozachmeur for making me aware of this interpretation.
23strictly concave, i.e. W′′ < 0, the social planner will therefore want to redistribute
to individuals with lower total expected utility, i.e. those with low life expectancy.
The optimal point will be to the right of point A, for instance in point B. Here the


















Now deﬁne a ≡ W′(EUb)/W′(EUg) > 1. Then the maximization of the social
welfare function (60) is equivalent to maximization of expected utility (1) with
a > 1. Thus, we can reinterpret a > 1 as the relative welfare weight given to
individuals with low life expectancy at the optimum. This shows that a lump-
sum withdrawal option can also be justiﬁed on pure equity grounds without the
assumption of a state-dependent utility function. If a is smaller than the criti-
cal value ˜ a, the ﬁrst-best can be implemented; otherwise the incentive constraint
for individuals with high life expectancy will be binding and only a second-best
solution is possible.
Proposition 4.1. If types differ ex ante in life expectancy and the so-
cial planner maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function, it is op-
timal to give individuals a choice between a lump-sum payment and
an annuity if life expectancy and marginal utility of consumption are
negativelycorrelated. If socialwelfareisstrictlyconcave inthetypes’
total expected utility, this choice is optimal even if the marginal utility
of consumption is independent of life expectancy.
245 Conclusion
This paper examined the optimal design of pension plans when the health status
during retirement is uncertain. In contrast to standard models, we assumed that
the health status affects both life expectancy and the marginal utility of consump-
tion. A simple model demonstrated that choice between a lump-sum payment and
an annuity can be welfare-enhancing if the health status is not observable. This
result holds if the marginal utility of consumption and life expectancy are nega-
tively correlated. This result proved robust in several extensions. For example,
we allowed marginal utility of consumption to be imperfectly correlated with the
health status and considered that the maximum life-span does not depend on the
health status. In the latter case, the possibility of a partial lump-sum withdrawal
proved to be optimal if marginal utility of consumption and life expectancy are
negatively correlated. Furthermore, we showed that a lump-sum option can be
justiﬁed on equity grounds. When the social welfare function is strictly concave,
this result holds even if the marginal utility of consumption is independent of life
expectancy.
A limitationoftheanalysisisthatweassumedauniformretirementage. However,
health and life expectancy can be expected to have an impact on the retirement
age as well. For example, McGarry (2004) ﬁnds that the less healthy are likely
to retire earlier. Similarly, Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos (2004) observe that
those with very low subjective probabilities of survival choose a lower retirement
age. An interesting question for future research is whether early retirement and
lump-sum payments are substitutes if individuals value consumption higher when
their health state is bad.
Finally, the paper raises the empirical question on how health affects utility and
life expectancy of the elderly. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate
the correlation of marginal utility of consumption and life expectancy in old age.
As this paper shows this correlation is crucial for the optimal design of pension
plans.
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